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 CHAPTER 11 
 At least since the middle of the 18th century, Europe could conceive of itself 
as a dynamic society, but its own process of refocusing on technological 
innovation, law reform, education etc. only had to follow a logic of prog-
ress, while the world at large could simply be colonized. (Luhmann 1995c, 
20, our trans.) 
 There is a totalitarian bent of modernity that presents the other side, colo-
niality, as something to be overcome when, indeed, coloniality cannot be 
overcome by modernity, since it is not only its darker side but its very raison 
d’être. (Mignolo  2003b , 456) 
 I 
 Niklas Luhmann’s sociological systems theory has had a profound and 
lasting impact on the study of culture within German-speaking academia. 
Between the time he took on his professorship in Bielefeld in 1968, 
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famously announcing his research project as ‘the theory of society; term: 
30 years; costs: none’ (Luhmann 2012, xi), and his death in 1998, he 
published innumerable books and articles on almost every aspect of mod-
ern society. He is probably best known for his series of monographs on 
different function systems of society such as art, economy, science, law, or 
religion, culminating in his encompassing two-volume  Die Gesellschaft der 
Gesellschaft in 1997 (literally:  The Society of Society , translated into English 
under the title  Theory of Society only in 2012 and 2013). In the Anglophone 
world, Luhmann received less attention until recently; in part, this has to 
do with the fact that his work was often dismissed as abstract, too complex 
and inaccessible as well as, especially when compared to Habermas, too 
conservative. More technically, however, translating Luhmann has proven 
to be a challenging task and his work has not been readily available in 
English. Thus, the foundational  Soziale Systeme of 1984 only appeared 
in translation as  Social Systems in 1995, while, as mentioned above, his 
encompassing two-volume  Theory of Society appeared with a lag of 15 
years. Nevertheless, recent years have indeed seen a remarkable surge 
in Luhmann scholarship in Anglophone academic contexts, a surge that 
will surely intensify with the more encompassing availability of his works 
in translation and prominently placed introductions (cf., for example, 
Wellbery, Borch, and Reese-Schäfer). 
 Our aim in this contribution is to productively engage with the abstrac-
tions and complexities of Luhmann’s conceptions of society from a post-
colonial perspective, with a particular focus on the explanatory powers of 
his sociological systems theory when it leaves the realms of Europe and 
ventures to describe regions of the global South. In view of its more recent 
global reception beyond Europe, our aim is to thus—following the lead 
of Dipesh Chakrabarty— provincialize Luhmann’s system theory especially 
with regard to its underlying assumptions about a global “world society”. 
For these purposes, we intend to revisit Luhmann in the post/colonial 
contact zone: We wish to reread Luhmann in the context of spaces of trans-
cultural encounter where “global designs and local histories” (Mignolo), 
where inclusion into and exclusion from “world society” (Luhmann) clash 
and interact in intricate ways. The title of our contribution, ‘Luhmann 
in da Contact Zone’ is deliberately ambiguous: On the one hand, we of 
course use ‘Luhmann’ metonymically, as representative of a highly com-
plex theoretical design. We shall cursorily outline this design with a special 
focus on the notion of a singular, modern “world society”, only to confront 
it with the epistemic challenges of the contact zone. On the other hand, 
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this critique will also involve the close observation of Niklas Luhmann as 
a human observer (a category which within the logic of systems theory 
actually does not exist) who increasingly transpires in his late writings on 
exclusion in the global South. By following this dual strategy, we wish to 
trace an increasing fracture between one Luhmann and the other, between 
abstract theoretical design and personalized testimony. It is by exploring 
and measuring this fracture that we hope to eventually be able to map out 
the potential of a possibly more productive encounter between systems 
theory and specifi c strands of postcolonial theory for a pluritopic reading 
of global modernity. 
 II 
 Let us begin by recapitulating the basic assumptions behind Luhmann’s 
sociological systems theory. It seems fair to say that among all the “super-
theories” (cf. Luhmann  1995a , 4–5) formulated in the late twentieth cen-
tury, Luhmann’s theory of modern society confronts us with what is surely 
the widest distance between theoretical abstraction and the more or less 
concrete phenomena of its social analysis. It is a very long way from the 
formal abstraction of George Spencer-Brown’s operational imperative to 
“draw a distinction!” via the theoretical reformulation of the co-evolution 
of perception and consciousness on the one hand and of communication 
and society on the other, all the way to the description of the progressive 
differentiation of systems of society across modern history with all their 
various semantics which emerge from processes of self-observation and 
self-description. Still, there is a single common motif that pervades all 
theoretical levels of inquiry: the operation of observing an “unobservable 
world” (cf. Luhmann 2012, 24 and 87). 
 Put very simply, “operation” in systems theory marks the basic exis-
tence of systems and the continuous, autopoietic reproduction of its ele-
ments, while “observation” denotes a particular mode of operation which 
allows systems to gain and process information based on drawing distinc-
tions. Observation, in other words, is the specifi c operational mode of 
meaning- constituting systems. Since only an observer can speak of opera-
tions,  systems theory translates the “decisionist ur-scene” (Jahraus 83, our 
trans.) in Spencer-Brown’s mathematical-formalistic “draw a distinction!” 
into a basically infi nite process of generating and processing information; 
at the same time, by distinguishing and indicating, the same process nec-
essarily also excludes an “unmarked space” as the “back side” or darker 
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side of the distinction (cf. Spencer-Brown). It is vital to note here that 
systems theory insists that observing the world should not and must not 
be anthropomorphized; instead, systems theory defi nes observation in 
strictly formalized terms: in  Theory of Society , Luhmann stresses that the 
concept of “observation” ‘is used highly abstractly and independently of 
the material substratum, the infrastructure, or the specifi c mode of opera-
tion that enable observations to be carried out’ (Luhmann 2012, 34; on 
the general constructivist framework cf. Luhmann 2006a). 
 What is striking in view of these basic premises of systems theory is an 
ever-increasing rigour in the conceptual treatment of the “border” between 
systems and their environment. In his early  Social Systems , Luhmann estab-
lishes the notion of strictly autopoietic systems in which the generation 
of meaning ( Sinn ) is by defi nition limited to and thrown back upon the 
system itself and its formalized recursive operations. In systems theory 
the environment may be observed by way of external reference; however, 
in order not to endanger systemic autopoiesis, inferences from the sys-
temic environment are generally reduced to an ‘unspecifi c (meaningless) 
“noise”’ (Luhmann 2012, 32)—noise, what is more, which itself may only 
be observed as an internal construction of an elusive extra-systemic Other. 
In  Social Systems , the specifi c metaphorical repertoire to demarcate such 
borders still implies a certain degree of permeability—Luhmann speaks of 
‘membranes, skins, walls and doors, boundary posts and points of contact’ 
(Luhmann 1995a, 29) to illustrate the self-generated boundaries of social 
systems. Such permeability is gradually displaced by a rhetoric of rigorous 
closure, however, owing to an ever increasing conceptual emphasis on the 
strictly autopoietic recursiveness of systemic observation and distinction. 
In his last work,  Theory of Society , Luhmann thus stresses: ‘Observations 
can only affect observations […] can, in other words, only process informa-
tion; but they cannot touch things of the environment.’ (Luhmann 2012, 
49) To compensate the increasing absoluteness of his systemic borders, 
Luhmann has recourse to Humberto Maturana’s notion of “structural 
coupling”: While it remains impossible that the environment of any one 
system infl uences the system, the environment may well be a precondition 
for the functioning of systemic communication. The  structural coupling of 
systems matters not least when it comes to explanations of “exclusion” to 
which we will turn shortly. First, however, let us turn to the basic relations 
between social systems, society, and world society in Luhmann’s design. 
 The structural extension of a social system correlates directly with 
the reach of what Luhmann calls “communication”. The probability 
christoph.reinfandt@uni-tuebingen.de
LUHMANN IN DA CONTACT ZONE 155
of  communication, here, is essentially a function of specifi c media: The 
medium of language affects the level of understanding, dissemination 
media affect questions of reach, while symbolically generalized media of 
communication (such as power, money, or love) affect the acceptance of 
communication in terms of their compatibility with specifi c systems. Based 
on the fundamental observation that the global reach of especially the 
mass media has led to the global extension of all levels of communica-
tion, Luhmann relatively early on in his career ventured to promote the 
system “society” to a “world society” (cf. Luhmann 2012, 83–99). From 
the perspective of systems theory, society famously demarcates the one 
system which encompasses all communication. Based on this defi nition, 
then, “world society” cannot have a social exterior or Other: According 
to a strictly Luhmannian logic, it is impossible to assume that there are 
worlds which exist outside of the self-referentially emergent borders of 
modernity, simply because there is no communication beyond modernity 
that systems theory would or could recognize. 
 III 
 The starting point for our postcolonial critique of systems theory is the 
realization—fi rst substantially formulated by major proponents within sys-
tems theory in the early to mid-1990s—that the presumed globality of 
autopoietic function systems apparently does not hold for all parts of the 
“world”. ‘Looking at the facts’, Luhmann is propelled to admit in a 1995 
essay on inclusion and exclusion, ‘one can easily see that in many coun-
tries—especially in developing countries, but also in highly industrialized 
countries like Brazil and, to a lesser extent, in the United States—a signifi -
cant part of the population is forced to spend their lives under conditions 
of exclusion’ (Luhmann 1995b, 259, our trans.). Now, the (contested) 
notion of “exclusion” in systems theory provides excellent food for post-
colonial thought. 
 What is exclusion in systems theoretical perspective? To begin with, it is 
the structural counterpart to inclusion. What is crucial about  in clusion in 
systems theory is that it is no longer conceived as a task that involves soci-
ety as a whole in the logic of a functionally differentiated world society, but 
operates strictly on the level of its various function systems. How  ex clusion 
then happens is interpreted differently by different thinkers within systems 
theory: Luhmann himself assumes that in what he refers to as ‘realms of 
exclusion’, inclusion fails when individuals are ‘(too) highly integrated’ 
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into singular function systems (such as, for example, religion); this in turn 
triggers the cumulative exclusion/dropout/expulsion from other func-
tion systems, as he tends to illustrate with casual examples: ‘An example 
from India: Families living on the street with no fi xed address cannot reg-
ister their children for school.’ (Luhmann  1995b , 259, our trans.) 
 Irrespective of how they are interpreted, realms of exclusion pose a 
conundrum to any systems theorist: After all, persons living in realms of 
exclusion are out of reach as objects of communication, and they thus 
dodge the possibility of being observed and processed by systems which 
by defi nition remain refl exively bent back upon themselves. Luhmann 
accordingly states that the ‘logic of functional differentiation seems to 
become […] inconsistent with the facts of exclusion’ and concludes: ‘the 
distinction of inclusion (with loose integration) and exclusion (with fi xed 
integration) provides a “supercode” for society from which you have to 
take your bearings fi rst if you want to fi nd your way’ (Luhmann 1995b, 
260, our trans.). This admission, for us, is a far-reaching intervention: 
Even if he does not make it overtly explicit, the statement marks nothing 
less than a farewell to the notion of world society. Or put differently: In his 
late essays, Luhmann concedes that society does after all have a meaning-
ful external or Other which consistently eludes systemic observations and 
operations. 
 Not surprisingly, perhaps, this late concession has not found much sup-
port among those who administer Luhmann’s legacy. A case in point is 
Rudolf Stichweh, a sociologist of the Luhmann school who most intensely 
devoted himself to the further development of the exclusion/inclusion 
paradigm. Stichweh attempts to save Luhmann from his own later state-
ments by outright disavowing his thesis that ‘the differentiation of inclu-
sion and exclusion becomes a primary differentiation which comes before 
functional differentiation’ (Stichweh 2006, 58, our trans.). Almost impa-
tiently, Stichweh insists: ‘Today’s world society does not leave any socially 
unoccupied spaces, and thus there is no outside of society into which 
addresses which are to be excluded could be expelled—and particularly 
not in the form of other societies.’ (Stichweh  2009 , 37, our trans.) On the 
basis of this categorical assumption he describes exclusion as a problem of 
structural coupling between systems under the premises of ‘highly specifi c 
regional conditions’ (Stichweh 2009, 37, our trans.). Regional realms of 
exclusion, he argues, are by defi nition not globally interconnected, and 
consequentially exclusion, understood as a ‘multidimensional, cumulative 
and sequentially interconnected process of exclusion from a majority of 
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functional systems’ (Stichweh 2006, 45, our trans.), cannot be conceived 
as a phenomenon that antecedes society. Rather, exclusion strictly emerges 
within a functionally differentiated world society, based on the notion 
‘that modern society, like all societies, creates its own counterstructures’ 
(Stichweh 2009, 40, our trans.). 
 IV 
 The different interpretation of realms of exclusion and their relation to the 
conception of world society by Luhmann and Stichweh is signifi cant. What 
is more, it obviously tinges the way in which both theorists approach realms 
of exclusion rhetorically. It transpires that Stichweh is much more devoted 
to what Albrecht Koschorke calls the “desire for purity” ( Reinheitsbegehren , 
cf. Koschorke 49) in systems theory than Luhmann himself. According to 
Stichweh, one can only speak about exclusion if there are “residual inter-
connections” with the realm of inclusion—wherever such links with the 
systemic centre are missing, observation is strictly speaking impossible:
 For these realms of exclusion the physical analogy of ‘black holes’ suggests 
itself, turning the world into a kind of universe interspersed with ‘black 
holes’. Occasionally, something drops into them. When you come near 
them, the danger increases that you will not be able to extricate yourself 
from their pull. Never (or very rarely) does anything return from inside. 
They are nearly unobservable, because even the energy which you invest 
into observing them does not return. Due to this, we know nearly nothing 
about their internal structure. (Stichweh 2006, 59, our trans.) 
 Stichweh insists on the ‘physical analogy’ of the “black hole”, because 
‘the radicality of its premises exposes the limits of a sociological model’ 
(Stichweh 2006, 59, our trans.). Yet what is diffi cult to ignore here are the 
almost uncanny resonances of imperial topoi underneath the seemingly 
innocent metaphorical recourse to the natural sciences. Allow us a brief 
excursion to the most (in)famous colonial metaphor of imperial exclusion 
in Anglophone literature to argue our case. 
 If Stichweh points out that society has no exterior anymore, Joseph 
Conrad’s  Heart of Darkness similarly makes it very clear from the start that 
the white patches on those maps over which Charlie Marlow sat mesmer-
ized in his childhood have long disappeared by the time he embarks on 
his ventures in the Belgian Congo. Once Marlow has ‘drop[ped] into’ 
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the realm of exclusion (which in Conrad is of course both primordial 
 and a consequence of functionally differentiated globalization in intri-
cate ways),  Heart of Darkness , too, dramatizes an overwhelming ‘danger 
[…] that you will not be able to extricate yourself ’ (Stichweh 2006, 59, 
our trans.). Surely, Conrad’s observer manages to ‘return from inside’ 
the heart of darkness again, but indeed, as in Stichweh’s diagnosis, not 
before the realm of exclusion has sucked all energy from him—and it does 
not seem far-fetched, too, to read energy here as the energy invested in 
vainly observing an elusive Other which constantly dodges enlightened 
modernity’s taxonomies of distinction. Marlow escapes from his encoun-
ter with the heart of darkness stripped down to bare life, and can fi nally 
tell his story on board the cruising yawl  Nellie on the River Thames, back 
in the very heart of functionally differentiated modernity, represented not 
least by his select audience (all former seamen, now lawyer, accountant, 
manager, writer). 
 No doubt, a systems theorist would protest and object to this analogy, 
arguing that it is based on an illegitimate confusion of categories: Bare 
life and embodiment, realms of exclusion as concrete territorial space, the 
observer as an anthropomorphic fi gure—all this has nothing to do with 
the semantics of exclusion and observation in systems theory. Granted—
however, what is important for our intervention into sociological systems 
theory is that Luhmann himself persistently performed a very similar con-
fusion of categories in his late writings on exclusion. In another of his 
1995 essays, ‘Beyond Barbarism’, Luhmann for instance writes:
 To the surprise of the well-meaning it must be ascertained that exclusion 
still exists, and it exists on a massive scale and in such forms of misery that 
they are beyond description. Anybody who dares a visit to the  favelas of 
South American cities and escapes alive can talk about this. […] To this 
effect, no empirical research is needed. Who trusts one’s eyes can see it, and 
can see it so impressively that all explanations at hand will fail. (Luhmann 
2006b, 269) 
 Such statements have repeatedly irritated Luhmann’s systems theoretical 
readers. The later Luhmann, the lament goes, falls prey to an ‘impression-
ism of sociological description’ (Opitz 190, our trans.) in his writings on 
exclusion, an impressionism that is thoroughly at odds with the almost 
pedantic insistence on categorical precision in his oeuvre at large. What 
is it, then, in Luhmann’s writings on exclusion, that motivates “literary” 
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ruptures of such Conradian quality within the otherwise so sober and for-
malistic calculus of systems theoretical observation? 
 As Sina Farzin has carefully analysed, Luhmann’s essays on exclusion 
are marked by a distinct ‘intensifi cation of imagery, illustrative metaphors 
and concrete case descriptions’ (Farzin 192, our trans.) which deliberately 
break with his own conventions of academic writing. Take the passage 
quoted above: Surely, Luhmann’s ‘anybody’ visiting the Brazilian favelas 
and Conrad’s Marlow are much closer to each other than Stichweh would 
be prepared to accept. After all, as Farzin points out about Luhmann’s 
observer: ‘The observer of exclusion is not a self-referential system of 
whatever kind but clearly anthropomorphic. He must be able to fear for 
his life and to trust his own eyes, and he must have the ability to narrate if 
he wants to report what he sees.’ (Farzin 204, our trans.) This “re-natu-
ralized” observer—who is “impressed” by, and ultimately testifi es to, what 
he has seen—becomes a recurring fi gure in Luhmann’s work on exclusion, 
a fi gure which is persistently employed to vouch for the “visibility” of the 
realm of exclusion which must by defi nition remain invisible to the opera-
tions of social systems. Farzin closes her analysis with the observation that 
the ‘boundary between system and environment, which is predicated on 
exclusiveness and insuperableness, is persistently undermined by the form 
in which social exclusion is observed.’ (Farzin 207, our trans.). From a 
postcolonial perspective, however, it is diffi cult not to carry the implica-
tions much further. 
 We argue that the apparent discursive fracture in Luhmann’s writings 
should be understood as a fundamental marker of unease with the ver-
sion and vision of modernity brought forth by his own systems theory. It 
seems that Luhmann felt no longer at ease within the universal aspirations 
of his theoretical design, owing to the fact that he found it increasingly 
impossible to deny the existence of socially signifi cant “worlds” outside 
of (or within) functionally differentiated modernity, while simultaneously 
having to concede that their signifi cance eludes the systemic logic of his 
model. This unease markedly sets him apart from most other proponents 
of contemporary systems theory—but of course it hardly makes him a 
 postcolonial thinker either. As for Conrad, for Luhmann, too, Europe 
remains the centre of theoretical observation and operation, and this is 
nowhere as blatantly evident as in his accounts of exclusion in the South. 
Take the following characteristic sentence, for instance: ‘When […] you 
stay in Brazilian cities, and you move on streets, squares, beaches, a con-
stant observation of the position, distance, and number of human bodies 
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is an indispensable competence.’ (Luhmann  1995b , 262, our trans.) Who 
is the generalized observing ‘you’ here? Surely, ‘you’ is not someone who 
is from the South; instead, we are obviously dealing with an anthropomor-
phic observer—call him “Luhmann”—who slips back and forth across the 
borders and laws of his theoretical design, and who—not unlike Marlow 
on the  Nellie —tells those who like to listen about his impressions “in the 
realm of exclusion”:
 When the other (and consequentially oneself) counts primarily as a body, 
the danger for life and limb increases. Besides, there is no correlation 
between body relevance and specifi c function systems with their respective 
symbolically generalized media of communication. Physical violence, sexu-
ality, animalistic primary satisfaction of needs become freely available again 
(i.e. without taking heed of symbolic recursions), and this prevents commu-
nication of a more sophisticated kind. (Luhmann 1995b, 263, our trans.) 
 It is impossible, surely, to miss the chilling proximity of such accounts of 
Southern “realms of exclusion” to the characteristic ideological projections 
of colonial travel writing (bare life, threatening physicality, disease, primi-
tive sexuality, and so on), a proximity that places Luhmann in an uncom-
fortable continuity with imperial epistemologies which further legitimate 
our brief digression to Conrad. Yet the major conceptual challenge to sys-
tems theory is this: Which authority accounts for all the observations and 
distinctions? If ‘functional differentiation cannot order its realm of exclu-
sion in spite of the fact that according to its socio-universal self-conception 
it should actually include it’ (Luhmann 1995b, 260, our trans.), who then 
“orders” these observations? Or put differently: Who speaks, from where, 
for whom, here, and produces what sort of knowledge by, in the lingo of 
systems theory, taking recourse to which symbolically generalized media 
of communication? 
 V 
 The widening gap between Luhmann and Luhmann in the contact zone—
the curious split between the abstract theoretical design of systems theory 
on the one hand, and Luhmann as an anthropomorphic observer on the 
other—is precisely the space in which we would like to develop a postco-
lonial intervention into the ways in which systems theory constructs its 
notion of global modernity. Systems theory and theoretical approaches 
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commonly labelled as postcolonial have been set against one another 
before (see, for example, the contributions in Grizelj and Kirschstein) and 
some of the most prominent systems theorists have turned to postcolo-
nial debates in their work (see, for example, Stäheli and Stichweh). This 
mainly pertains, however, to postcolonial approaches which have been 
widely canonized in Western academia and are typically indebted to post-
structuralist thought (most notably the work of Homi Bhabha). By way of 
contrast, we will in the following foreground select aspects of the work of 
Argentinian theorist Walter D. Mignolo, whose writing is strongly infl u-
enced by a range of “postcolonial” thinkers less familiar in Western cur-
ricula, among them Enrique Dussel, Anibal Quijano, or Rodolfo Kusch 
in the Latin Americas, Edouard Glissant in the francophone Caribbean, 
Abdelkhebir Khatibi and Hélé Béji in Northern Africa, or Ranajit Guha 
and other members of the Indian Subaltern Studies Group. Building on 
these voices, Mignolo’s conceptions of difference in  The Darker Side of 
the Renaissance (1995),  Local Histories/Global Designs (2000), and  The 
Darker Side of Western Modernity (2011) challenge systems theory in intri-
cate ways. 
 Mignolo’s work is of particular interest in this context as his observa-
tions of the modern world are distinctly informed by ideas from within 
the realm of systems theory, if not via Luhmann, then via Humberto 
Maturana. Unlike Luhmann, Maturana conceives of the distinguishing 
observer not as both the origin and motor of an autopoietic system, but 
as an external unit uncoupled from the dynamics of systemic autopoiesis 
(cf. Hayles). Mignolo accordingly conceives of second-order observation 
in ways fundamentally different from Luhmann’s: The differentiating 
observation of the observation is not a strictly formalized, inner-systemic 
operation, but a distinctly  social act, an act which attends to the ‘posi-
tionality and politicization of the understanding subject and his or her 
drive to know or understand’ (Mignolo 2003a, 24). This is of particular 
importance as, for Mignolo, difference is generated not  within systemic 
boundaries, but precisely by the epistemic frictions  between systems in con-
crete transcultural encounters. In Mignolo’s analysis, colonial difference 
was constitutive of early European self-observations as “modern” during 
the fi rst phase of accelerated globalization, but its role was eclipsed by the 
universalizing cultural narratives of the Enlightenment of which systems 
theory is an heir. It is therefore paramount to re-emphasize ‘the mobility 
of the centre, the power to speak or write, and the construction of loci of 
enunciation’ (Mignolo 2003a, 24–5). In other words: this entails that we 
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need to relocate modern difference, the location from which it is observed 
and the ways in which it is operationalized in the colonial  contact zone . We 
use this term with reference to Mary Louise Pratt’s coinage in her work on 
 Travel Writing and Transculturation , where it is defi ned as ‘the space of 
colonial encounters, the space in which people geographically and histori-
cally separated came into contact with each other and established ongoing 
relations, usually involving conditions of coercion, radical inequality, and 
intractable confl ict’ (Pratt 6). If we indeed reconceive modern difference 
as fundamentally generated in the contact zone, we need to thoroughly 
rethink the foundations of Luhmann’s systems theory. 
 This fi rst and most fundamentally concerns the ‘decisionist ur-scene’ 
(Jahraus 83, our trans.) of systems theory. The imperative “draw a distinc-
tion!” can no longer be conceived of as largely disinterested and distanced, 
or, in the wake of Spencer-Brown, as a purely formalized operation follow-
ing a simple binary logic. Instead, drawing a distinction needs to be read as 
a performative act; an act whose epistemic ordering function is always tied 
to specifi c observers in very specifi c socio-historical situations of contact. 
Difference, in this scenario, does not simply “emerge” within a system, 
but it is a refl ex of the confrontation with an Other to which the observer 
relates in concrete historical situations. As such, difference may advance 
to become the recursive motor of a specifi c social system; yet it can only 
do so by persistently relating to this Other which it excludes. Precisely by 
performatively excluding the systemic Other, it is paradoxically included as 
the system’s “darker side”: “Drawing a distinction” in this sense is never 
innocent; rather, it is inevitably also an imperial gesture whose epistemic 
ordering function remains tied to a specifi c locus of observation, while it 
either negates other possible loci, or sets them radically into perspective. 
 It seems fair to say that systems theoretical refl ections on modernity are 
largely devoid of any level of refl exivity about their locus of enunciation 
from within the hegemonic centre of Western modernity. This is nowhere 
more obvious than in the ways in which systems theorists have dealt with 
the “realms of exclusion” of world society. Within the totalitarian border 
regime of advanced systems theory, the observation of observation is not 
only thrown back upon the  act of observation in the fi rst degree, but 
crucially also on its monocentric  location . This, however, makes systems 
theory very susceptible to an epistemic complicity with the imperial logic 
of Western (neo)colonialism. Put differently, systems theory unrefl ectingly 
tends to reproduce a Eurocentric image of the modern, an image in which 
since the Enlightenment any other “locus of enunciation beyond the logic 
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of modernity” is adamantly disavowed, and “even when disavowed” radi-
cally set in dependence to the default locus of the modern in an ever 
increasingly hegemonic world order. Mignolo concludes that ‘[t]he simul-
taneous logic of disavowal and dependency of all possible loci of enuncia-
tion (from religious to economic, from legal to political, from ethical to 
erotic) is the hidden logic of modernity, the logic that justifi es its place as 
guiding light and point of arrival, on the one hand, and of disavowal and 
dependency on the other’ (Mignolo 2003b, 441–2). Systems theory, to 
this day, has largely perpetuated this logic. 
 VI 
 How may systems theory be reformulated from a postcolonial perspective 
in such a way that it no longer reiterates the “hidden logic of modernity”? 
Surely what is at stake here is not playing out one theoretical paradigm 
against another. A postcolonial critique of systems theory should not 
aim at completely throwing overboard the observation of a world society 
which has evolved according to the structuring principles of functional 
differentiation which have shaped Europe over the past 400 years. The 
global reach of function systems of this kind can hardly be denied; how-
ever—and this is crucial—it is mandatory that systems theory give up the 
‘socio-universal self-conception […] of the logic of functional differentia-
tion’ (Luhmann 1995b, 260, our trans.). Rather, we should conceive of 
such function systems as “global designs” in Mignolo’s sense, which inter-
act on all levels with “local histories” in complex ways (cf. Mignolo 2000). 
 Such local histories are always already entangled with global modernity, 
as they hardly ever exist in isolation from, but in intricate relation to global 
function systems. Luhmann himself affi rms this when he argues that ‘the 
problems which are topical today—from problems of hunger and politi-
cal corruption to the emergence of new religious cults—are by no means 
relics of a bygone order, but rather direct correlates of  modernity itself ’, 
and goes on to comment: ‘Typically, the function systems of world society 
intensify found inequalities, as it is rational for them to make use of differ-
ences.’ (Luhmann 1995c, 19, our trans.) The point is, however, that the 
complexities of modernity cannot be adequately described if such “found 
inequalities and differences”—following Pratt and Mignolo these would 
be the fault lines of the contact zone, in which global designs and local 
histories clash and generate difference—are only observed from the locus 
of enunciation that marks the “zero point epistemology” of the global 
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designs. If we subscribe to the idea that modernity constitutes itself in 
the interaction between global designs and local histories (or in systems 
theory’s most extreme test case: between society and realms of exclusion), 
then we also need strategies of observation and description that are pluri-
perspectival and reciprocal; we need an epistemic model which transcends 
the absolutist border metaphors of systems theory. Following Michel 
Foucault, Darcy Ribeiro (“subjugated knowledges”), and Ranajit Guha 
(“subaltern knowledges”), Mignolo frames this as the necessity of “border 
gnosis” or “colonial semiosis”. ‘Colonial semiosis’, argues Mignolo,
 attempt[s] to identify particular moments of tension in the confl ict between 
two local histories and knowledges, one responding to the movement for-
ward of a global design that intended to impose itself and those local his-
tories and knowledges that are forced to accommodate themselves to such 
new realities. Thus, colonial semiosis requires a  pluritopic hermeneutics 
since in the confl ict, in the cracks and fi ssures where the confl ict originates, 
a description of one side of the epistemological divide won’t do. (Mignolo 
2000, 17, our emphasis) 
 This surely matters not only in view of the historical dimensions of a 
global modernity, but also in view of the descriptions of its presences and 
futures. Whoever really wishes to learn more about the varieties of the 
modern in today’s urban peripheries in the South, for instance, should 
not stumble into the black holes of Stichweh’s reasoning, nor should 
he or she believe in the testimonies of Luhmann, the man who trav-
els beyond his own system. Instead, studies like Ravi Sundaram’s  Pirate 
Modernity demonstrate compellingly that there are complex social worlds 
beyond “world society” which can hardly be observed from the epis-
temic centres of systems theory in Lucerne or Bielefeld, yet which are 
hardly less, and perhaps even more “modern”. In the concrete example of 
Sundaram’s study, these are large parts of urban Delhi which participate 
in the global fl ows of media and technologies piratically—that is by stra-
tegically bypassing the global function systems of law, economics, or art. 
Underground markets like Delhi’s Palika Bazaar or Nehru’s Place, this is 
to argue, are sites of tradition and of (hyper)modernity at the same time, 
of exclusion from and inclusion into global function systems; they are 
contact zones in which local histories and global designs are perpetually 
(re)negotiated in intricate ways (Sundaram 97–102 and, more generally, 
Eckstein and Schwarz). How super is a “supertheory” whose dynamics 
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of self-observation and self-description cannot grasp—or only unilater-
ally grasp—such paradigmatic phenomena of global modernity? Niklas 
Luhmann’s late essays on exclusion indicate that he grappled with this 
question; systems theory after Luhmann yet needs to come up with com-
pelling answers in order to live up to its encompassing epistemic aspira-
tions in a globalized world. 
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